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THE SOVIET ROLE
IN INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION*
By HANS HEYMANN, JR.
Senior Research Staff Member, The Rand Corporation
U NTIL quite recently, Western travelers who had occasion to use
the services of the Soviet civil airline Aeroflot were notably un-
impressed by if not downright scornful of the operational procedures
and levels of technology displayed by the Russians in this field. At
its best, the Soviet air-transport system seemed austere and undis-
tinguished; at its worst, it looked like an ambitious kind of national
barnstorming operation rather than a modern airline. It was evidently
a low-priority Soviet activity that had been allowed to languish too
long in technical isolation and economic neglect, and that had been
left virtually untouched by the vast development of global air com-
munication that had taken place in the Western world.
In the last 2 or 3 years, however, the Soviet leaders suddenly appear
to have discovered the usefulness of civil aviation as an instrument of
foreign policy, both in the political and in the economic sphere. The
airplane has begun to figure more and more importantly in the Soviet
foreign economic offensive, as a symbol of the new Soviet modernism
in technology and benevolence in diplomacy. As a result of a fairly
modest but exceedingly well-directed effort over the last few years,
Soviet aviation has managed very effectively to obscure the fact of its
over-all backwardness, and to convey to the outside world a most im-
pressive image of itself as a serious and powerful contender in the
international air-transport field. Though still essentially representing
the DC-3 age of aviation, the Soviet Union can now lay claim to being
the only country in the world that operates jet-transport services on
domestic and international routes, and to flying, at least in prototype,
the world's largest airliner. Though still confining its operations largely
within the Communist Bloc, Aeroflot is now taken seriously when it
talks ambitiously of extending its services to the four corners of the
earth.
The "New Look" in Soviet aviation is being received in the West
with a mixture of fascination and concern. The international aviation
press has begun to follow closely the burgeoning activities of Aeroflot
and to regard Soviet air transportation respectfully as "a force to be
reckoned with." The British Minister of Supply, in a recent speech,
found it necessary to warn Western aircraft manufacturers that Soviet
competition in the export sale of aircraft soon may be "a very serious
matter indeed." Western embassies in the Middle East and Southeast
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Asia are expressing alarm at the prospect of Soviet aviation "penetra-
tion" into the under-developed countries, with its much-vaunted
opportunities for espionage, subversion, and assorted political mis-
chief; and the view is widely held that the Russians are now embarked
on a vast program of global air-transport expansion that is designed
to undermine our own aviation leadership.
How warranted are these fears and how realistic these predictions?
Is the Soviet Union in fact able to challenge the West in the air-trans-
port field and does it intend to do so? Or are there perhaps broader
political ambitions and objectives that explain the new Soviet interest
in civil aviation? This report attempts to answer these questions.
Specifically, it examines the problem from two points of view: (1)
From the point of view of aviation equipment, what do the recent
development trends in the USSR tell us about the Soviet ability to
compete technologically or economically in this field? And (2) from
the point of view of international air routes, how serious are their
ambitions, and how promising their opportunities, for developing a
global air-transport network?
SOVIET EQUIPMENT
It may be helpful to divide the development of civil aircraft in the
Soviet Union into three distinct stages. These stages will be described
briefly and will be illustrated with tables comparing present and future
Soviet civil aircraft with equipment now in use or on order in the
West.
STAGE 1
The first stage might be called "Lingering Obsolescence," because
it characterizes the severe handicap under which Soviet civil aviation
still operates today. Because of long neglect, the Soviet Union finds
itself still very much in the DC-3 era of aviation, suffering from obso-
lete aircraft, primitive airfields, and grossly inefficient operating tech-
niques.
This obsolescence becomes immediately apparent when we look at
the types of piston aircraft that today constitute the backbone of the
Soviet passenger-transport inventory, as shown in the first part of





Year into Service Soviet Aircraft Western Counterpart
Twin-engine Piston Aircraft
1940 LI-2 (Lisunov) Douglas DC-3
1947 IL-12 (Ilyushin) Martin 202/404
1954 IL-14 1 ar 20/40
1957 IL-14M Convair 240/340
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B. PERFORMANCE
Nearest
Specifications Soviet Aircraft Western Counterpart
IL-14/14M Convair 340/440
Date into service 1954/1957 1952/1956
Gross weight, lb. 36,300/38,000 47,000/49,100
Number of seats 18/26 44/52
Best cruise speed, kn 165 247
Maximum payload range, n mi 1560 1000/2000
Price quoted (excluding spares) $280,000 $750,000
Russians under license from Douglas, and the IL-12 and 14, both
obsolescent and highly uneconomical to operate, constitute together
about 85 per cent of the passenger-carrying capacity of Aeroflot. Inter-
estingly enough, the IL-14, in slightly modified forms, is now in pro-
duction in substantial numbers in Czechoslovakia (Aero-14) and in
East Germany (ILGA-14).
In the second part of Table I, the performance of the IL-14 is
compared with that of our own Convair. The differences are striking,
indeed:
The IL-14 has an exceedingly low ratio of payload to gross
weight; that is, it takes 2000 to 3000 pounds of aircraft to carry
a single passenger. The Convair weighs only 1000 pounds per
passenger carried. Lack of weight control, leading to costly in-
efficiency, has been a chronic defect in all Soviet civil aircraft
now in regular service.
The Convair has about a 50 per cent higher cruising speed
than the IL-14, which means that the work capacity of the Soviet
airplane is much inferior on that account also.
Small wonder that when the Russians offered this airplane for sale
to India in 1956, the Indian government, after taking a good look at
the operating economics, felt that it had to turn the deal down, in spite
of the attractive price quoted by the Russians.
So much for Stage 1, the lingering obsolescence with which Soviet
aviation is still burdened.
STAGE 2
Stage 2 might be called "Hasty Transition." Note from Table II
that the Russians have simply skipped the entire generation of four-
engine piston airplanes that have played such an enormously important
role in our own air-transport development over the last 15 years.
In an effort to overtake the West, and perhaps even surpass us, the
Russians took a long and somewhat incongruous leap directly into the
jet age, in the shape of the by now famous TU-104.
How successful was this hasty transition? Well, the TU-104 has won
half a dozen world records; the Soviet Union can claim the distinction
of being the only country in the world that operates jet transports in





Year into Service Soviet Aircraft Western Counterpart
Four-engine Piston Aircraft





1957 TU-104A 5 (Sud Aviation)
B. PERFORMANCE
Nearest
Specifications Soviet Aircraft Western Counterpart
TU-104/104A Caravelle
Date into service 1956/1957 1958
Gross weight, lb. 150,000 94,800
Number of seats 50/70 64/80
Powerplant thrust (2) turbojets, (2) turbojets, 10,500 lb.
19,000 lb.
Best cruise speed, kn 460 425
Maximum payload range, n mi 1400/1700 1400/1650
Price quoted (excluding spares) $1,190,000 $1,950,000
regular service; and, most important, the Soviet leadership has been
able to chalk up some impressive propaganda victories.
But in terms of any sensible standards of air-transport economics,
the TU-104 simply does not qualify as a commercial transport. It is
merely a clever improvisation, a hasty adaptation of a medium bomber
to civil purposes. In converting his TU-16 bomber into a transport,
Tupolev conveniently retained the bomber wing, the tail assembly,
the engines and the landing gear and simply redesigned the fuse-
lage to carry passengers rather than bombs. We could have done pre-
cisely the same thing 5 years earlier to our Boeing B-47, and it would
have made just as little economic sense.
By way of illustration, the performance of the TU-104 is compared
with that of its closest Western counterpart, the French Caravelle.
Again we find that the Soviet airplane is very heavy relative to its
payload and range capabilities. It is more than 50 per cent heavier
than the Caravelle but carries a smaller payload over roughly the
same distances. Its sole advantage is speed, and this is certainly worth
something; but it is achieved through the use of phenomenally large
engines with voracious appetites for fuel. Scandinavian Airlines,
mostly out of curiosity, sent a team of engineers to Moscow to look
over the airplane. They came back convinved that even if the Rus-
sians gave the TU-104's away for free, a commercial airline could not
afford to operate them.
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So far, this appraisal of Soviet equipment has been harshly nega-
tive: the aircraft now in operation in the USSR will simply not stand
up to a rigorous commercial comparison with their counterparts in the
West.
STAGE 3
An appropriate name for Stage 3 might be "Impending Competi-
tion." The new Soviet prototypes that are to go into service in the
near future (see Table III) present a very different picture. In fact,
it seems that they constitute an entirely new generation of technically
and economically attractive Soviet aircraft.
In the first place, out of the four new Soviet models, three are
powered by turboprops, a form of powerplant on which the Russians
have worked very hard while the United States has been sitting on its
hands. From what we know about Soviet turboprop developments,
we have every reason to expect some highly reliable and efficient
powerplants in these airplanes.
Moreover, these airplanes can no longer be called hasty adaptations
of military models to civil use. The Ukraina, for example, seems to
be an intelligent compromise between a military transport and a
passenger aircraft, while the Moskva is obviously newly designed as a





Year into Service Soviet Aircraft Western Counterpart
Four-engine Jet Aircraft
1958 TU-110 Comet 4 (de Havilland)
Four-engine Turboprop Aircraft
1958 AN10 (Ukraina) Lockheed Electra
1958 IL-18 (Moskva) Vickers Vanguard




Specifications Soviet Aircraft Western Counterpart
AN-10 Ukraina Lockheed Electra
Date into service 1958 1958
Gross weight, lb. 112,000 113,000
Maximum payload, lb. 29,000 21,000
Number of seats 84/126 66/91
Best cruise speed, kn 325 353
Maximum payload range n mi 1900 2400
For the first time, also, the Russians have made a systematic effort
to reduce weight, discarding the old 1898 Pullman parlor-car furnish-
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ings and the cast-iron toilets that up to now have been standard equip-
ment on Soviet airplanes, and relying extensively on foam rubber,
light-weight metals, and plastics.
Even more surprising is the attention paid to the more subtle ways
of lowering the operating costs and improving the commercial attrac-
tiveness of the new models - such things as efficient ground-handling
and servicing provisions, fuselage layout, accessibility of cargo hatches
and baggage compartments - all of the hundreds of little design tech-
niques that are so important to the achievement of rapid turnarounds
and that add up to customer appeal. It is impressive that these tech-
niques, up to now the exclusive hallmark of Western manufacturers,
have been learned by the Russians so quickly and so well.
The potential competitiveness of the new Soviet models is well
typified by the performance comparison shown between the Ukraina
and the Lockheed Electra. The payload-gross-weight ratio has now
shifted drastically in favor of the Soviet model, and the Russians seem
to be embracing the concept of high-density seating for the first time.
The large payload capacity of the Ukraina was, of course, achieved to
some extent at the expense of range; the range of the Ukraina is sub-
stantially less than that of the Electra. But this seems to be a deliberate
Soviet policy, and it may give us an interesting clue to Soviet aviation
intentions.
To illustrate this point, the Soviet and Western developments are
listed in Table IV in four range categories, from ultralong haul down
to ultrashort haul. With a single exception, the Soviet aircraft fall
into the medium-short-haul and very-short-haul class. On the other
hand, the most important Western developments, particularly those
of the United States, lie almost entirely in the long-haul field.
For the West, the explanation is obvious: The routes that have
always been of greatest interest to the West as money-makers are long-
haul nonstop routes such as the North Atlantic run and the new
transpolar routes. Western operators are constantly under competitive
pressure to provide a maximum of nonstop service. Thus we have
tended in our aircraft designs to stretch range capabilities to the
utmost, at considerable cost to ourselves in added structural weight,
long-runway requirements, and so forth.
The fact that the Russians have not followed suit suggests that they
are guided in their aircraft design not by any desire to capture a share
of the lucrative international air traffic, but rather by the more modest
range demands of their own domestic-route structure, and perhaps
also by the requirements of international air communication within
their own Eurasian continent - including particularly the Middle
East, Western Asia, and the Far East.
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In this connection, it is worth noting that the Russians have made a
special effort to design their new models to operate from very short
runways and rough landing strips. They did this no doubt with their
own primitive airfields in mind, but at the same time they were not
unaware of the special appeal that this design feature would have in the
under-developed world.
But with all the good economic sense that seems to have gone into
the new aircraft, it should not be assumed that the Russians have aban-
doned their quest for a quick psychological impact.
The TU-1 14 - the Rossiia - is ideally suited for exploitation as a
fine example of the sputnik approach to aviation. This aircraft is a
passenger conversion of the huge Soviet Bear bomber. It has four of the
largest turboprop engines in the world, with eight contrarotating pro-
pellers, a cruising speed of over 400 knots, and a range that is more
than adequate for a nonstop flight to New York. The deluxe 120-pas-
senger version features a 48-seat restaurant, replete with tables and
dumb-waiters, a telephone system, private sleeping cabins, and the kind
of seat-spacing that spells the ultimate in luxury, comfort, and magni-
ficence. Such an airplane cannot, of course, win any medals for its oper-
ating economy, but for the moment Aeroflot may consider it more
important to dazzle the passenger than to sell the commercial operator
on the attractions of this vehicle.
This is not to say that the TU-1 14 is an unattractive airplane. On
the contrary, a tourist-class version, carrying 220 passengers in a high-
density seating arrangement, is now planned by Aeroflot, and such an
airplane might well show lower seat-mile costs over medium and long
ranges than anything the West is likely to put into the air in the next
few years. But for the present, Aeroflot needs prestige, and in this quest
luxury may count for more than economy.
This leads to the second part of the discussion, namely the develop-
ment of Soviet international air routes.
DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET AIR ROUTES
In the field of air transport there is no parallel to the maritime
concept of the "open seas" and freedom of entry into any port. On the
contrary, the extravagant ideas of national air sovereignty that prevail
have meant that the right to fly aircraft commercially from one country
to another must be specifically negotiated between governments. This
has given rise in the West to a complex system of bilateral air-transport
agreements that vary widely in their degree of restrictiveness.
On the whole, the United States has been at the liberal extreme of
the spectrum; we are a party to a multitude of agreements and con-
ventions aimed at greater freedom of air commerce, and we are also a
leading member of the international organizations (International Civil
Aviation Organization and International Air Transport Association)
that provide technical and operational supervision of international
aviation. The USSR, on the other hand, has occupied an extreme posi-
tion at the other end of the spectrum; she has abstained completely
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from air commerce outside her own borders and has resisted all urging
to join the international aviation community.
Until very recently the Soviet postwar aviation history was one of
isolation, negativism, and neglect. The explosive development of global
air transport in the Western world left the USSR almost completely
untouched. As long as Stalin was alive not a single foreign commercial
flight was permitted to enter the Soviet airspace, not even flights op-
erated by Russia's own Satellites.
Soviet policy, however, began to change drastically toward the end
of 1954 and has been evolving ever since. What has been the effect so
far?
Figure 1 (page 274) shows the results of the new policy toward the
Satellites. Previously the Russians had no air agreements with any of
their own Bloc states; now all of them have been given the legal right
to fly reciprocal services into Soviet territory, at least for a short dis-
tance. The Chinese and the North Korean airlines now link up with
Aeroflot at the Asian border towns of Alma Ata, Irkutsk, and Chita.
All the Eastern European countries are permitted to fly into Moscow,
although only three have so far exercised this right, the Czech, Polish,
and East German airlines. In addition, the USSR has openly encour-
aged the more or less independent development of the Satellite airlines
and is supporting their ambitions to develop international routes of
their own, particularly through the supply of new aircraft, including
the TU-104.
A similar change has occurred in Soviet policy toward the major
Western flying nations outside Russia's own orbit. But before examin-
ing the effect of this policy change, let us consider the geographic
attractions of Soviet airspace for the West.
Figure 2 (page 275) shows important savings in distance that could
be realized if the Soviet Bloc would really open up its airspace. Most
important, perhaps, would be the link between Western Europe and
Japan. A direct trans-Soviet link would cut in half the existing route
going the long way around, and would greatly improve upon the new
SAS orient-polar route via Alaska. Another route, one that appeals
especially to the British, is that between London and Hong Kong,
providing a potential link with Oceania. One other possibility is a
route between the West Coast of the United States and India, which
could cut thousands of miles off the present routes.
On the basis of distance alone, these routes certainly seem impres-
sive, but it is well to remember that geography is only a small part of
the problem. There is a real question, for example, of how much traffic
would actually flow over such long-distance express routes. How much
intermediate traffic could be developed on these routes? The Soviet
Bloc itself is certainly not a promising market for future international
passenger travel.
There is also the question as to whether the Soviet Bloc would be
willing to cooperate internationally in the development of controlled
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airways. A great deal of intimate technical cooperation is required for
this, but so far the Russians have been both unwilling and unable to
provide even the minimum technical services needed.
In other words, the enthusiasm of Western airlines for a trans-Soviet
route should be very much dampened by these considerations, but it
isn't. For reasons of competitive rivalry and national prestige, Western
airlines have been vying with each other for the chance at traffic rights
into the Soviet orbit, and the Russians have taken full advantage of
this by playing off one against the other.
Figure 3 (page 277) pictures existing and proposed air routes into
and around the Soviet Union. The thinner lines represent the present
network of Western trunk routes skirting the Soviet Bloc-a kind of
"capitalist air encirclement." The heavy solid lines represent actual
Western routes now being flown into the USSR. Only a few Western
airlines have so far succeeded in implementing a reciprocal air agree-
ment with the Russians: SAS, which now links the Scandinavian capi-
tals with Moscow; the Finnish airline which operates a service between
Helsinki and Moscow; KLM, linking Amsterdam to Moscow; Sabena,
operating between Brussels and Moscow; and Air France, Paris to Mos-
cow. In each case Aeroflot reciprocates by flying a parallel service into
each of these capitals. In addition, the USSR has recently concluded air
agreements with the United Kingdom and with India, which will soon
permit similar reciprocal flights to be flown by BOAC between London
and Moscow and by Air India International between New Delhi and
Moscow. In every instance these flights terminate in Moscow.
Most Western airlines, however, are interested not so much in flying
just into Moscow as a terminus, but in obtaining traffic rights to
Moscow and beyond, to link up with the important global air routes.
Thus, for example, the West European airlines (SAS, BOAC, Air
France) would like to fly beyond Moscow to Tokyo; and Japan Airlines
would like to fly beyond Moscow to Europe.
The Russians, on the other hand, are determined to keep foreign
"penetration" to a minimum, and seem to be trying, wherever possible,
to hold foreign airlines to "gateway points" near their borders rather
than to permit them to cross any major portion of Soviet territory.
The only exception to this rule was made for, of all countries,
Afghanistan. The Soviet-Afghanistan air agreement gives Aeroflot the
right to fly into Kabul and beyond, in exchange for the Afghan airline's
right to fly into Moscow and beyond. The only catch is that the agree-
ment specifies that only native pilots and crews may be used on these
flights, and since Afghanistan has neither suitable aircraft nor native
crews, the Russians do not have much competition to fear from this
direction.
The reason for this restrictiveness toward foreign airlines is that the
Soviets have ambitions for their own. This becomes quickly apparent
when we look at A eroflot's route structure and its possible international
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extension. Figure 4 shows only the trunk routes with international
significance, and their proposed and hoped for future extensions. The
heavy lines represent all the TU-104 jet prestige routes that Aeroflot
now flies. It may be noted that they are oriented as much toward the
Middle East and Asia as they are toward Western Europe. Of course, by
far the most important route so far is that linking Prague with Peiping.
Thanks to an interline agreement between Air France and Aeroflot,
and thanks to the speed of the TU-104, it is now possible to leave Paris
on a Thursday afternoon, transact your business in Peiping on Friday,
get in a good night's sleep, and be back in Paris in time for dinner
Saturday night. Flying time, 161/ hours each way; the fare, $200 less
than by any alternative route.
The brightest gleam in the Soviet eye at the moment, of course, is
to extend this route to Tokyo and thereby complete the valuable link
between Western Europe and Japan. But how to do this unilaterally,
without having to give up any major part of this politically valuable
monopoly? This turns out to be quite a dilemma:
One possibility for the Russians is to ask the Japanese to permit
Aeroflot to extend its route from Khabarovsk to Tokyo, in exchange
for a Japanese flight from Tokyo to Khabarovsk. Khrushchev has, in
fact, already made such an offer, and the Japanese promptly turned it
down. They, of course, want traffic rights at least to Moscow; in other
words, a fair exchange of capital for capital. But for the Russians this
would mean a rival on a route they want very much to keep for them-
selves.
Alternatively, the USSR might ask China to approach the Japanese
with an offer of exchanging air services between Peiping and Tokyo.
This the Japanese might accept, but then it would not be the Soviet
flag but the Chinese flag that would reap the glory of completing this
valuable link between Europe and Asia, and this might not be to Rus-
sia's liking. For the moment, at least, there seems to be no satisfactory
solution for the Russians on this route.
Another major Soviet ambition lies in the direction of India and
Burma, and ultimately Indonesia. Here the Russians have already
scored a clever success in Afghanistan, where they obtained traffic
rights into Kabul and beyond in exchange for a worthless paper-con-
cession to the Afghanis that they cannot implement.
But the next stop on the route is India, and here they have found
that they are dealing with a much more sophisticated government
and a modern airline with a keen desire, and ample capabilities, to
exploit the attractive route from Delhi via Moscow to London. For
Aeroflot to obtain "beyond" rights in Delhi, India insists that the
Russians yield comparable "beyond" rights in Moscow - something
they have so far refused to do. The new Indo-Soviet air agreement
provides only for exchange of traffic rights between Moscow and
Delhi as termini.
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EVALUATION
Soviet aviation tactics show no signs of being guided by considera-
tions of commercial advantage, or by a desire to become a responsible
member of the international aviation community. It might even. be
argued that the Soviet Union is not really interested in international
aviation as such. Instead, the Soviets seem to look upon aviation as
just another device, though a very attractive device, that can be used
to enhance their political-power position at relatively low cost to
themselves.
Up to now, what we have been seeing is a quite modest effort, con-
sisting in the timely and selective use of very limited Soviet aviation
resources for the purpose of winning political good will and techno-
logical respect, particularly in the under-developed world. In the future
we are sure to be faced with a much more ambitious drive on the part
of the Soviets to exert their aviation influence in that area through
aircraft sales, technical aviation assistance, and modern air communi-
cation.
The first step in this direction is to develop technically and eco-
nomically attractive aircraft. This they have done, and the new Soviet
models will go into service in substantial numbers in the next 3 years.
The next step now is to procure for Aeroflot the recognition and pres-
tige that goes with the role of a major international flag carrier. To
achieve. this, they will want to fly their own aircraft into London,
Paris, Tokyo, and New York - not because they want to compete with
Pan American Airways or TWA, but because it will make the flag on
the new Soviet jets look brighter and more impressive when they land
in Cairo, Delhi, and Rangoon.
For the United States it is important to recognize the Soviet avia-
tion offensive for what it is: not a commercial challenge aimed at
undermining the air-transport leadership of the West, not a bid to
slug it out with us competitively in the open market, but a broad
contest for national prestige and political influence that employs avia-
tion as only one of many weapons in its versatile arsenal.
